I can, I do, and so I like:From power to action and aesthetic preferences by Woltin, Karl-Andrew & Guinote, Ana
Power and Motor Fluency 1 
 
I Can, I Do, And So I Like: 
From Power to Action and Aesthetic Preferences 
 
Karl-Andrew Woltin1,2 & Ana Guinote3 
 
1 Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, Belgium 
2 Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom 
3 University College London, United Kingdom 
 
word count: 8783 (including abstract, main text and footnotes; excluding title, references, 
author affiliations, acknowledgments, figures and figure legends) 
 
Author for correspondence: 
Karl-Andrew Woltin 
Royal Holloway, University of London  
Department of Psychology 
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom 
e-mail:  karl-andrew.woltin@rhul.ac.uk 
phone / fax: +44 – (0) 1784 – 443707 / – 434347 
 
Authors’ Note:  
The research was supported by a grant as Chargé de Recherches from the Fonds de la 
Recherche Scientifique (F.R.S.-FNRS, FC 85908, first author), and from the British 
Academy (SG132223, second author). We thank Sascha Topolinski, Helmut Leder, Hao 
Shen, and Sian L. Beilock for providing us with the original materials, and Audrey Geers, 
Sullivan Fontesse, Madalina Vlasceanu, and Kily Wong for data collection. We also thank 
Vincent Y. Yzerbyt for advice on the treatment of the covariates.   
Power and Motor Fluency 2 
Abstract 
 The current work tested the hypothesis that power increases reliance on experiences 
of motor fluency in forming aesthetic preferences. In four experiments participants reported 
their aesthetic preferences regarding a variety of targets (pictures, movements, objects, and 
letters). Experiments 1, 2 and 3 manipulated power and motor fluency (via motoric 
resonance, extraocular muscle training, and dominant hand restriction). Experiment 4 
manipulated power and assessed chronic inter-individual differences in motor fluency. 
Across these experiments power consistently increased reliance on motor fluency in aesthetic 
preference judgments. This finding was not mediated by differences in mood, judgment 
certainty, perceived task-demands or task-enjoyment, and derived from the use of motor 
simulations rather than from power differences in the acquisition of motor experiences. This 
is the first demonstration suggesting that power changes the formation of preference 
judgments as a function of motor fluency experiences. The implications of this research for 
the links between power and action, as well as the understanding of fluency processes are 
discussed.  
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I Can, I Do, And So I Like: 
From Power to Action and Aesthetic Preferences 
 A growing body of evidence suggests that perceivers rely on experiential information 
to construe judgments (for reviews, see Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007). While a great deal of this evidence has focused on the roles of affective and cognitive 
feelings (for rewiews, see Bless & Forgas, 2000; Clore, 1992; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Strack, 1992), recent findings show that motor processes also enter 
as an input in judgment (Topolinski & Strack 2009a; Topolinski & Strack 2010). 
Specifically, it was found that training and ease of motor execution facilitate action 
simulation and the appreciation of stimuli that necessitate matching motor codes (Beilock & 
Holt, 2007; Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011; Elder & Krishna, 2012; Leder, Bär, & Topolinski, 
2012; Shen & Sengupta, 2012; Topolinski, 2010). This reliance on motor processes has been 
assumed to be universally used by perceivers. Nevertheless, recent research suggests that 
states of individuals, for example mood (Ruder & Bless, 2003), and social factors, such as 
power (Guinote, 2010; Weick & Guinote, 2008), are capable of altering reliance on 
experiential information (for a review, see Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Guinote, 
2015). In particular, social power (Guinote, 2010; Weick & Guinote, 2008) increases reliance 
on experiential information. This research shows that individuals automatically monitor their 
relative power in social interactions and derive their information processing strategies from 
their relative power. Thus reliance on motor experiences could also be affected by such social 
factors. In the present article we propose that an actor’s social power affects reliance on 
motor processes during the construction of aesthetic judgments.  
 Power is for doing. Power holders are on the go. Those possessing power talk and 
interrupt others more (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002; Schmid Mast, 2002), have disinhibited 
and richer action repertoires (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), and are the first to take 
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action in incidental (Baumeister, Chesner, Senders, & Tice, 1988; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
Magee 2003) and planned contexts (Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003). These effects have been 
associated with the activation of the Behavioral Approach System (Keltner et al., 2003), 
which facilitates the approach of rewards and opportunities. Indeed, power holders more 
easily cause an impact in their social environments and attain goals. Could, however, the 
actions of power holders have consequences beyond the outcomes they intend to produce?  
 Consistent with findings that the motor system has consequences beyond the 
production of action (e.g., for language comprehension; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), and that 
motor experiences can be re-enacted and used in the construction of judgments, we propose 
that power increases reliance on action components in the construction of judgment. Based 
on evidence that subsidiary components of action are used in the construction of aesthetic 
judgments (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011; Elder & Krishna, 2012; 
Leder, Bär, & Topolinski, 2012; Shen & Sengupta, 2012; Topolinski, 2010), and that power 
holders use more bodily experiences (Guinote, 2010a; Weick & Guinote, 2008), we argue 
that power increases reliance on motor fluency in aesthetic judgments. Thus, when it comes 
to power, actions can have more far reaching consequences than considered so far.  
 Demonstrating that current social factors –such as power differences–are crucial in 
determining to what extent motor fluency is integrated in the construction of preference 
judgments would inform research about the joint effects of social and basic motor processes 
in judgment construal. 
Motor Fluency in Aesthetic Judgments 
 A long-standing question in psychology has been what creates aesthetic pleasure 
(Lipps, 1903). Reber, Schwarz and Winkielman (2004) proposed an interactionist 
perspective, suggesting that aesthetic pleasure and beauty are grounded in metacognitive 
experiences. Metacognitive experiences are subjective, cognitive feelings caused by factors 
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such as figure-ground contrast, stimulus repetition, or prototypicality, which affect the ease or 
fluency of stimulus processing; when fluency is high stimuli are liked more (cf. Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). For example, classification fluency (processing speed) increases 
aesthetic appreciation of art while analytic thought disrupts the fluency-liking relationship 
(Halberstadt & Hooton, 2008).  
 Recently motor components have also been found to influence fluency and 
subsequently judgment (Topolinski & Strack 2009a; Topolinski & Strack 2010). Leder et al. 
(2012) proposed that performing hand movements corresponding with the style of observed 
paintings would increase aesthetic appreciation, as perceiving a painting style elicits covert 
simulations of concordant hand movements in viewers (Calvo-Merino, Urgesi, Orgs, Aglioti, 
& Haggard, 2010; Taylor, Witt, & Grimaldi, 2012). Indeed, performing a stippling movement 
while observing neo-impressionist/pointillist-style paintings or performing a stroking 
movement while observing post-impressionist/stroke-style paintings increased participants’ 
aesthetic appreciation of these pictures compared to performing non-corresponding hand 
movements. Thus, motor fluency stemming from resonance in motor representations, that is 
from a functional correspondence between the states in the motor system of the observer and 
that of the executor of the action (Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering and Haselanger (2011), 1 
increased aesthetic judgments.  
 Similarly, Topolinski (2010) demonstrated that training the extraocular muscles 
(EOMs; muscles that move the ocular bulb and are necessary in vision) to follow specific 
stimulus movements resulted in an increased preference for these movements. Training the 
EOMs increased preference for stimulus movements that had not been seen before but were – 
because of the training – easier on the eye. Thus, fluency stemming from unconsciously 
enhancing people’s extracocular motor activation and preparedness entailed greater aesthetic 
                                                
1 The term motor resonance is also used to indicate conditions in which “the motor system of the 
observer of an action resonates with her own perceptual system” (Uithol et al., 2011, p. 390).  
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pleasure of what was later seen.  
 Relatedly, Shen and Sengupta (2012) examined the consequences of restrictions of 
the dominant hand for the liking of objects typically used by this hand. In one experiment 
(Study 3), participants who held a fork with their dominant hand (vs. non dominant hand) 
experienced reduced fluency of movement simulation towards a graspable object in view (a 
pen). Subsequently, they liked the target object less. Hence, reduced motor fluency stemming 
from unobtrusively restricting people’s spontaneous motor system activation driven by object 
affordances (Tucker & Ellis, 1998) decreased liking of other graspable objects (for a similar 
finding, see Elder & Krishna, 2012). 
 Finally, Beilock and Holt (2007) reasoned that for skilled typists letter-dyads typed 
with the same finger of the same hand (e.g., FV) compared to dyads typed with different 
fingers of different hands (e.g., FJ) create motor interference, because typing experience 
results in the association between letters and motor programs used to type them (i.e., letter 
perception automatically activates corresponding motor plans; Rieger, 2004; Prinz, 1997). 
Indeed, skilled – but not novice – typists liked non-interference dyads more than interference 
dyads (see also Van den Bergh, Vrana, & Eelen, 1990). In other words, motor disfluency 
experiences stemming from chronic differences in the preparedness of the motor system 
reduced liking of interference letter dyads.   
 In summary, across different domains and different sources of motor (dis)fluency, the 
resonance of the motor system or its preparedness to perform the actions that were trained 
generated an experience of motor fluency that was then used in the construction of aesthetic 
judgments. Here we reasoned that factors affecting an individual’s access and use of bodily 
experiences should modulate the motor system’s impact on aesthetic judgments (cf. Häfner, 
2013). As power increases reliance on bodily information (Guinote, 2007a, 2010b) we 
hypothesize that it should increase reliance on motor fluency.  
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Power and Reliance on Motor Fluency  
Power refers to the ability to influence others or to control their outcomes (Keltner et 
al., 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Vescio et al., 2003). According to the situated focus 
theory of power (Guinote, 2007a, 2010b), having power enhances reliance on subjective 
experiences that arise on moment-to-moment basis, such as experiences that occur during 
thought processes (e.g., feelings of familiarity, ease of retrieval; Weick & Guinote, 2008) and 
bodily feelings (Guinote, 2010). Conversely, powerless individuals tend to engage in more 
controlled and extensive information processing in order to increase predictability and control 
(Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Guinote, Brown, & Fiske, 
2006; Keltner et al., 2003), placing experiential information at a relative disadvantage. For 
example, feelings of hunger predicted the amount of food eaten by powerful but not by 
powerless individuals (Guinote, 2010a). Power holders also relied more on cognitive feelings 
that arose during thought processes, such as ease/difficulty of retrieval (Weick & Guinote, 
2008). Finally, power holders acted more in line with feelings that arose when relating to 
their surroundings and reacted more strongly when encountering annoying stimuli compared 
to powerless individuals (Galinsky et al., 2003). In line with these findings, we derive the 
novel hypothesis that power increases reliance on motor experiences during the construction 
of judgments. 
Overview of the Present Research 
The present research tests the hypothesis that powerful, more than powerless, 
individuals form their aesthetic preferences based on subjective motor fluency. This 
hypothesis was tested in four experiments designed to examine fluency stemming from 
resonance in motor representations (Experiment 1), from motor activation and preparedness 
derived from extraocular muscle training (Experiment 2), from restrictions of spontaneous 
motor system activations (Experiment 3), and from differences in chronic preparedness of the 
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motor system (Experiment 4). By using chronic motor experiences we ruled out that the 
effects of power derive from the acquisition of motor experiences rather than the use of 
motor fluency experiences per se. Together, these experiments examined facilitative effects 
of increased motor fluency (Experiments 1-2), as well as detrimental effects of motor 
interference and restriction of motor fluency (Experiments 3-4) on aesthetic judgments. 
Experiments 1-3 manipulated power (powerful vs. powerless) and motor fluency. Experiment 
2 also included a control group. The roles of mood, judgment certainty, as well as perceived 
task-demands or –enjoyment and reported subjective feelings of fluency were also examined.  
Experiment 1: Covert Painting Simulations 
Experiment 1 examined effects of power on the use of covert motor programs 
activated by resonance in motor representations from seeing artwork to construe aesthetic 
judgments. Viewing artwork activates those motor programs in observers that were produced 
when the artwork was created (Freedberg & Gallese, 2007). For example, participants asked 
to simulate painters’ movements with their hands subsequently preferred paintings painted in 
the style matching (vs. mismatching) their hand movements (Leder et al., 2012). Using this 
paradigm, it was hypothesized that powerful participants would rely more strongly on covert 
motor programs, showing stronger movement/picture style concordance preferences than 
powerless participants.  
Method 
 Participants and design. Participants participated for €3 or course credit and were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless; between-subjects) 
x 2 (hand-movement: stippling vs. stroking movement; between-subjects) x 2 (art style: neo-
impressionist vs. post-impressionist; within-subjects) mixed design. We aimed at recruiting 
140 participants (i.e., roughly 3 times the number of participants in the experimental 
condition of Leder et al., 2012), and stopped recruitment once this number was reached by 
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enough participants (i.e., 142) signing up. Because of difficulties in the recruitment of 
participants, data was collected in two waves. Eight participants were excluded because they 
did not complete the power manipulation (n=1), the debriefing accidently remaining on the 
computer screen from a previous participant (and they thus knew our hypothesis; n=2), they 
guessed the study’s purpose (e.g., “making pulsating movements promotes liking of 
pointillism and the opposite for the other style”; n=3), or because they had difficulty using 
their non-dominant hand to provide responses (see below; n=2). This left 134 participants (80 
females, 53 males, 1 intersex/transgender; Mage=22.67, SDage=2.07) in the sample.   
 Procedure and materials.	  Power was manipulated by asking participants either to 
write an essay of a past event in which they had power over another individual/other 
individuals (powerful condition), or in which someone else had power over them (powerless 
condition; Galinsky et al., 2003). In an ostensible second study participants evaluated 10 
artworks on a scale from 1 (I do not at all like this painting) to 7 (I very much like this 
painting). Five neo-impressionist/pointillist-style and five post-impressionist/stroke-style 
paintings were presented to participants in random order. The paintings were taken from 
Leder et al. (2012; one painting was replaced due to resolution problems).  
 Participants were told that the study dealt with effects of dual tasking on art 
evaluation. During the picture presentation and rating, participants performed the hand 
movements with their dominant hand. In the stippling condition they held a pencil with an 
eraser tip and were asked to tap it on the table surface at a convenient pace. In the stroking 
condition they moved it in strokes of approximately 20 cm from left to right on the table.  
Subsequently, participants reported on 7-point scales how much they were in charge 
(1=not at all to 7=fully) and how much influence they had (1=very little to 7=very much; 
r=.70, p<.001) in the situation described earlier.  
To rule out alternative accounts, the role of perceived task-demands, mood, and task-
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evaluation was assessed. Task-demands was measured by asking: “To what extent did you 
find the task exhausting?” (1=not at all to 7=very much); mood by asking participants how 
they felt (1=sad, bad, discontent, and tense to 7=happy, well, content, and relaxed, 
respectively; α=0.79); and task-evaluation by asking to what extent participants thought the 
task was nice (reversed), irritating, pleasant (reversed), and boring (1=not at all to 7=very 
much; α=0.81). Because power increases confidence (Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 
2012), we assessed participants’ judgment certainty by asking how confident/certain they 
were concerning their evaluations (1=not at all to 7=very much; r=0.91, p<.001). We did not 
run any additional conditions or measure any additional dependent variables not mentioned 
here or in the footnote2.   
Results  
Manipulation check. An ANOVA with the between subjects factors power and hand-
movement revealed that participants in the powerful condition felt more in control (M=5.43, 
SD=1.17) than participants in the powerless condition (M=2.62, SD=1.36), F(1,130)=163.54, 
p<.001, ηp²=.56, CI95% [2.368, 3.234]. The power manipulation was therefore successful.  
Aesthetic preferences. Preliminary analyses indicated that judgment certainty tended 
to be higher when performing a hatching (M=4.36, SD=1.52) compared to a stippling 
movement (M=3.96, SD=1.42), F(1,130)=2.43, p=.12, ηp²=.02. Also, task-evaluation was 
dependent on the joint effects of power and hand movement, F(1,130)=4.14, p=.044, ηp²=.03, 
such that powerful participants liked the task more when performing a stippling rather than a 
                                                
2 We explanatorily assessed with four items each to what extent participants based their judgments on 
thoughts (e.g., “I based myself …on my thoughts about the pictures’ contents and arrangements”; α=.36), 
knowledge (e.g., “… on my knowledge of painting styles”; α=.45) and feelings about the paintings (e.g., “… on 
the feelings the pictures evoked”; α=.77) and to what extend participants felt in harmony with the painter and 
certain paintings (e.g., “My feelings of harmony played an important role in my evaluations; I felt in harmony 
with some works but not with others”; α=.64). We refrain from interpreting variables with unacceptably low 
internal consistencies. The only result obtained was a power x movement interaction for feelings, 
F(1,127)=4.97, p=.027: high power participants provided similar ratings regardless of their movement 
(Mstippling=4.88 and Mstroking=4.77; F<1.7, p>.19), low power participants making a stippling movement (M=4.20) 
tended to provide lower ratings than those making a stroking movement (M=4.80), F(1,127)=3.46, p=.065.  
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hatching movement (Mstippling=3.80, SDstippling=1.33 vs. Mhatching=3.05, SDhatching=1.19), which 
reversed for low power participants (Mstippling=3.46, SDstippling=1.33 vs. Mhatching=3.66, 
SDhatching=1.55). Task-evaluation, judgment certainty and the certainty x power interaction 
(cf. Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004)3 were therefore entered in the analyses below. There 
were no effects for mood or task-demands, Fs<1, ps>.46.  
Participants’ picture ratings were subjected to a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless; 
between-subjects) x 2 (hand movement: stippling vs. stroking; between-subjects) x 2 (art 
style: neo-impressionist/pointillist-style vs. post-impressionist/stroke-style; within-subjects) 
mixed ANOVA. This analysis revealed a power x hand movement x art style interaction, 
F(1,127)=4.24, p=.042, ηp²=.03 (see Fig. 1), all other within-subject effects Fs<1.65, all other 
ps>.20, all ηp²<.014; concerning between-subject effects, all Fs<2.3, all ps>.13, all ηp²<.017, 
except for a main effect of task-evaluation, F(1,127)=10.16, p=.002, ηp²=.07, and a marginal 
main effect of hand movement, F(1,127)=2.55, p=.113, ηp²=.02, indicating that on average 
the paintings were evaluated more positively when performing stroking compared to stippling 
movements. Not controlling for judgment certainty and task-evaluation resulted in a similar, 
albeit marginal interaction, F(1,130)=3.11, p=.08, ηp²=.02.  
As expected, for powerful participants the hand movement x art style interaction was 
significant, F(1,127)=4.86, p=.029, ηp²=.04, CI95% [-1.224, -0.066], whereas this interaction 
was not significant for powerless participants, F<1, p>.45. Powerful participants’ liking of 
post-impressionist and pointillist paintings was dependent on the congruency between their 
hand movements and the paintings. Those performing a stoking movement liked post-
impressionist/stroke-style paintings more (M=4.40, SD=1.07) than neo-
                                                
3 Yzerbyt and colleagues demonstrated that when testing interactions, simply including a covariate 
correlated with an independent variable is in most cases an inadequate model. This is the case because the 
interaction between the two independent variables is only estimated without bias when the interaction between 
the covariate and the independent variable is included in the analysis. To illustrate, if the independent variables 
X1i and X2i were manipulated and their interaction is of interest, but at the same time covariate Ci is affected by 
X1i , then the X1i X2i interaction is confounded with the Ci X2i interaction, which needs to be included. 
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impressionist/pointillist-style paintings (M=4.08, SD=1.02), F(127)=3.65, p=.058, ηp²=.03. A 
non-significant reverse tendency occurred for powerful participants performing a stippling 
movement (neo-impressionist/pointillist-style paintings: M=3.94, SD=1.08; post-
impressionist/stroke-style paintings: M=3.74, SD=1.06), F(127)=1.62, p=.205, ηp²=.01.   
Discussion 
Powerful participants’ aesthetic preferences depended on the (in)congruence of their 
covert painting simulations in relation to observed paintings (i.e, their movements’ simulation 
of the presented artistic styles and thus their resonance in motor representations). In contrast, 
powerless participants remained unaffected by their hand movements/paintings 
(in)congruence.  
The current experiment provides evidence for fluency stemming from resonance in 
motor representations affecting judgments of the powerful more strongly than those of the 
powerless. However, it does not speak to the direction this effect. Therefore, Experiment 2 
included a control condition. Furthermore, it sought to go beyond motor representations and 
to directly target muscular fluency. 
Experiment 2: Trained Motor Programs 
Experiment 2 employed muscular training to induce motor fluency. Following 
Topolinski (2010), the training temporarily induced ocular motor fluency experiences 
stemming from increased motor activation and preparedness for certain stimulus movements 
participants saw. Importantly, participants in this paradigm are unaware of being trained. 
Nonetheless, this training promotes preference for trained-to-see (vs. not trained-to-see) 
movements. We expected effects to be especially pronounced for powerful (vs. powerless) 
individuals. A control condition was included to explore whether power increases or 
powerlessness decreases motor fluency reliance.  
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Method   
Participants and design. We aimed at recruiting 100 participants (i.e., roughly 2 
times the average number of participants in the experiments of Topolinski, 2010) and stopped 
recruitment once enough participants had signed up. One hundred and one participants 
participated in this study. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 3 (power: 
powerful vs. control vs. powerless; between-subjects) x 2 (EOM-matching: matching vs. 
nonmatching; within-subjects) mixed design, and received £6 for their participation. Four 
participants were excluded: One indicated not having complied with the head movements 
instructions, one did not turn up the volume and therefore missed instructions, one quit the 
task, and one non-native speaker had difficulties understanding the instructions and took 
almost double the average time. This left 97 participants (56 females, 40 males, 1 
transgender; Mage=23.90, SDage=5.03) in the sample.  
 Procedure and materials. Participants completed the power induction task as in 
Experiment 1, with an additional control condition in which participants wrote about their 
day “yesterday” (Galinsky et al., 2003). In an ostensible second experiment participants then 
underwent the procedure designed by Topolinski (2010). They watched film clips of a black 
dot filling white circles in a matrix (see Fig. 2). The dot always started in a randomly chosen 
matrix corner and moved clock- or counterclockwise along its edges toward a diagonally 
opposite corner in seven steps, remaining at each position for 500ms, and featuring both a 
vertical and a horizontal trajectory (see Fig. 2). This allowed for eight different dot-
movement sequences that were presented to participants twice in random order. They 
evaluated the 16 dot-movements on a 9-point scale (1=not at all pleasant, 9=very pleasant). 
To train EOM kinematics to follow specific dot-movements, prior to each film clip 
participants received instructions over headphones to move their heads in a vertically or 
horizontally trajectory and then in the respective other trajectory, while keeping their eyes on 
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the fixation cross at the center of the computer screen. In eight matching trials, the head-
movements trained the EOMs to perceive the following dot-movements (e.g., moving the 
head downwards and then left while keeping the eyes at the fixation cross induces the same 
EOM kinematics as watching the dot move upwards and right). In eight mismatching trials, 
one of the two head-movement directions did not train the EOMs for the following dot-
movement (in the example above a head-movement upwards and left).  
Participants completed the same two-item manipulation check as in Experiment 1 
(r=.75, p<.001; 9-point scales). We explored task-evaluation (4 items; α=0.71), mood (4 
items; α=0.82), and task-demands by asking participants “How mentally [physically] 
demanding was the dot-task?” (1=not at all to 9=very much; r=0.51, p<.001). We did not run 
additional conditions or measure additional dependent variables not mentioned here. 
Results  
Manipulation check. An ANOVA on participants averaged scores revealed that the 
power manipulation was successful, F(2,94)=49.18, p<.001, ηp²=.51. Participants in the 
powerful condition reported more control (M=7.31, SD=1.47) than participants in the 
powerless (M=2.95, SD=1.82), t(94)=9.66, p<.001, d=2.64, CI95% [3.462, 5.253], or in the 
control condition (M=6.11, SD=2.12), t(94)=2.68, p=.009, d=0.66, CI95% [0.311, 2.088]. The 
control and powerless conditions also differed as expected, t(94)=6.90, p<.001, d=1.60, CI95% 
[2.249, 4.067]. 
Aesthetic preferences. Preliminary analyses indicated that power did not affect 
participants’ task-evaluation or mood, Fs<1.56, ps>.21, all ηp²<.033, and only marginally 
affected perceived task-demands, F(2,94)=2.33, p=.103, ηp²=.05 [indicating that in the 
control (M=4.53) compared to the powerful (M=3.45) or powerless (M=3.97) condition 
participants tended to perceive the task as more demanding]. Task-demands and dot-
movement evaluations were not correlated in any condition, rs<.24, ps>.18; including task-
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demands as covariate, the power x EOM-matching interaction reported below remained 
significant, F(2,93)=3.20, p=.045, ηp²=.06. 
Participants’ dot-movement evaluations were submitted to a 3 (power: powerful vs. 
control vs. powerless; between-subjects) x 2 (EOM-matching: matching vs. nonmatching; 
within-subjects) mixed ANOVA, which yielded an EOM-matching main effect, 
F(1,94)=4.30, p=.041, ηp²=.04, (Mmatching=5.53, SDmatching=1.30)  vs. Mnonmatching=5.37, 
SDnonmatching=1.35), replicating Topolinski (2010). Crucially, this was qualified by a power x 
EOM-matching interaction, F(2,94)=3.26, p=.043, ηp²=.07 (see Fig. 3). As expected, 
participants in the powerful condition rated matching dot-movements as more pleasant 
(M=5.47, SD=1.20) than nonmatching dot-movements (M=5.09, SD=1.17), t(33)=2.70, 
p=.011, d=0.57, CI95% [0.095, 0.677]. In contrast, participants in the powerless condition 
evaluated dot-movements similarly (Mmatching=5.41, SDmatching=1.26 vs. Mnonmatching=5.49, 
SDnonmatching=1.36), t(30)<1, p>.54, and so did participants in the control condition 
(Mmatching=5.71, SDmatching=1.47),  vs. Mnonmatching=5.55, SDnonmatching=1.50), t(31)=1.47, p>.15, 
d=0.19. According to Bonferroni post-hoc tests in an ANOVA on participants’ difference 
scores for matching vs. nonmatching movement evaluations, the control condition did not 
differ from the powerful, p=.648, or the powerless condition, p=.592, but the powerful and 
the powerless conditions significantly differed from each other, p=.037. Thus, the effects of 
motor fluency seemed to linearly increase with power. Nevertheless, only the powerful relied 
on motor fluency to construe aesthetic judgments. 
Discussion  
Powerful participants integrated the increased fluency generated by trained-to-see (vs. 
not trained-to-see) movements in their aesthetic preferences; they demonstrated increased 
aesthetic preferences for movements their eyes had been temporarily trained to follow. 
Importantly, participants were unaware of being trained to perceive certain dot-movements, 
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ruling out demand effects4.  
Whilst this experiment speaks to the direction of the effect (power increasing reliance 
on motor fluency rather than a lack of power decreasing it) and involved direct muscular 
training, it would be important to not only investigate motor fluency, but also motor 
interference/disfluency. To this end, Experiment 3 investigated effects of motor fluency being 
reduced by restricting participants’ motor program activation. 
Experiment 3: Restricted Motor Programs 
Previous research found that pictures of frequently grasped objects are sufficient to 
spontaneously induce mental representations of grasping and holding the objects – that is, 
people’s motor system is spontaneously activated based on the observation of the object’s 
affordances (Tucker & Ellis, 1998).  
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that visual depictions that portray an object 
oriented towards participants’ dominant (vs. non-dominant) hand facilitate mental 
simulations of motor responses, and increase purchase intentions of the object (i.e., an 
indicator of product liking; Elder & Krishna, 2012). However, interference with grasping 
movements decreases perceived fluency and liking of the target objects. For example, 
holding a restricting object (a fork) in the dominant hand impairs participants’ perceived 
fluency of the grasping simulation, and results in them liking the graspable target object (a 
pen) less compared to holding the restricting object in their non-dominant hand (Shen & 
Sengupta, 2012).  
This paradigm is important because it shows the effects of motor interference on 
                                                
4 To test participants’ awareness of our hypothesis, they answered several questions, probing if they 
noticed anything special (in general, with the dot- or the head-movement), what they thought the study was 
about, if they had an idea why we asked them to make the head-movements, and if they were able to detect the 
connection between the head- and the dot-movement. One participant reported: “Head left/down is eyes 
right/up”, but could not state our hypothesis relating to power. Most participants stated ideas concerning 
possible connections between the essays and the dot-task (e.g., “if feeling power makes people more likely to 
quit a rather boring task”), but none connected power to visual ease.  
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linking judgments. Whilst the online assessment of fluency from motor system activation is 
rather difficult (and often achieved via proxy variables, such as reaction times; Tucker & 
Ellis, 1998), similar information can be gained from assessing motor interference5. In 
addition, the paradigm allows examining whether participants’ perceived fluency contributes 
to differences in liking judgments (cf. Shen & Sengupta, 2012).  
Experiment 3 followed Shen and Sengupta’s (2012) paradigm. We expected powerful 
participants’ liking judgments of the viewed, graspable object (the pen) to be more strongly 
guided by their restricting (vs. non-restricting) motor condition causing (vs. not causing) 
interference than those of powerless participants. We also assessed liking for the restricting, 
held object (the fork). Because dominant hand movement simulations are more fluent than 
non-dominant hand movement simulations we expected participants to like more this object 
when in their dominant hand (vs. in the non-dominant hand). Crucially, this tendency should 
be more pronounced for powerful participants. Finally, we explored whether power would 
affect perceived fluency of imagined reaching movements towards the graspable object, and 
if this could account for differences in liking. 
Method 
Participants and design. We aimed at recruiting 100 participants (i.e., roughly two 
times the average number of participants in the experiments of Shen & Sengupta, 2012). 
Recruitment stopped once enough participants had signed up. One hundred and two 
participants took part in this experiment for either £2 or course credit. They were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (motor restriction: 
dominant vs. non-dominant hand) between-subjects design. Participants took part in 
individual cubicles, received all instructions and completed the task on a computer. 
Participants were excluded if they guessed the experiment’s purpose (e.g., “Possibly the 
                                                
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach.  
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interaction between the position of the pen on the screen and the hand in which I was holding 
the fork; and how power has an influence on how much we like the fork/pen depending if it is 
in the congruent position”; n=3), reported difficulties with the experiment (n=1), or when 
they were outliers in the analyses below (determined by Cook’s D values, studentized 
residuals and graphical examination of the index plot as described in analysis procedures by 
Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003; n=2). The final sample thus comprised 96 participants 
(59 females, 37 males; Mage=22.08, SDage=5.33).   
Procedure and materials. Participants allegedly took part in two unrelated studies, 
one on past events (which entailed the power manipulation of Experiment 1) and one on 
product evaluations (which followed the procedure of Shen & Sengupta, 2012, Experiment 
3). For this second study, participants were invited to provide feedback about a fork and, for 
this purpose, they were first asked to hold it for a while. They randomly received instructions 
to hold the fork either in their left or in their right hand; their restriction conditions (dominant 
vs. non-dominant hand) were coded based on their report of handedness, assessed at the very 
end of the experiment.  
While holding the fork participants were invited to participate in a filler task in which 
they were presented with a picture of a pen on the computer screen (taken from Shen & 
Sengupta, 2012) and were asked to form an impression of it. After having seen the pen for 10 
seconds, participants received instructions to put down the fork and to respond to a set of 
questions (all using 7-point scales, with the question sequence following Shen and Sengupta, 
2012).  
Participants were first asked to what extent they had imagined reaching toward and 
holding the pen6 (imagination; 1 item; 1=not at all to 7=a lot), and how imagining holding 
                                                
6 This question was only included because we wanted to keep the same sequence and set of questions as 
in Shen and Sengupta (2012); they included this item, for which they “did not make a priori predictions” (p. 
527), so that participants would not find it strange to be asked the subsequent question regarding fluency.  
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the pen felt (fluency of imagination; 4 items; anchors on 7-point scales at difficult-easy, 
unpleasant-pleasant, wrong-right, uncomfortable-comfortable; α=0.81). Subsequently they 
were requested to rate the fork and the pen (3 items; anchors on 7-point scales at 
unattractive-attractive, unfavourable-favourable, negative-positive; αfork=0.88; αpen=0.90).  
Participants then completed the same two power manipulation check items as in 
Experiment 1 (r=.72, p<.001) and we again assessed their task-evaluation (4 items; α=0.73) 
and mood (4 items; α=0.91). Finally they provided demographic information, and their 
handedness. We did not run additional conditions or measure additional dependent variables 
not mentioned here. 
Results  
Manipulation check. An ANOVA with the between-subjects factors power and 
motor restriction indicated that the power manipulation was successful, as participants in the 
powerful condition felt more in control (M=5.88, SD=0.81) than in the powerless condition 
(M=2.82, SD=1.15), F(1, 92)=226.14, p <.001, ηp2=0.71, CI95% [2.687, 3.504].  
Aesthetic preferences – target object (pen). Preliminary analyses indicated that 
there were no effect of power or motor restriction on task-evaluation, all Fs<1.18, ps > .28, 
all ηp²<.014. However, compared to powerless participants (M=4.06, SD=1.24), powerful 
participants (M=4.93, SD=1.23) reported being in a better mood, F(1,92)=11.03, p<.01, 
ηp²=.11 (all other Fs<1, ps>.36). Therefore, mood and the mood x motor restriction 
interaction were included in the analyses below (cf. Yzerbyt et al., 2004). 
A 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (motor restriction: dominant vs. non-
dominant hand) ANOVA on participants’ pen evaluation scores revealed a power x motor 
restriction interaction, F(1,90)=4.37, p=.039, ηp²=.05 (for power and motor restriction Fs <1, 
ps>.76). Not controlling for mood and the mood x motor restriction interaction resulted in a 
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similarly significant interaction, F(1,92)=5.40, p=.022, ηp2=.06 (see Table 1), indicating that 
these covariates can be ignored. Powerful participants tended to evaluated the pen less 
favorably when their motor program was restricted (Mhigh power=5.31, SDhigh power=1.18) than 
when it was not restricted (M=5.85, SD=0.74), F(1,92)=2.84, p=.096, ηp²=.03, while this 
difference was not significant for powerless participants (Munrestricted=5.15, SDunrestricted=1.27; 
Mrestricted=5.67, SDrestricted=0.95), F(1,92)=2.57, p=.113, ηp²=.03. In addition, when 
participants’ motor program was restricted (their dominant hand was occupied) no pen 
evaluation differences emerged, F<1.38, p>.24, ηp²<.02, but when participants’ motor 
program was not restricted (their dominant hand was not occupied) powerful participants 
evaluated the pen more favorably than did powerless participants, F(1,92)=4.26, p=.042, 
ηp²=.04, CI95% [0.260, 1.372].  
Aesthetic preferences – held object (fork). The same ANOVA on participants’ fork 
evaluation scores revealed a motor restriction main effect, F(1,92)=5.32, p=.023, ηp2=.06, 
CI95% [0.820, 1.093], such that participants liked the fork more when holding it in their 
dominant (M=4.44, SD=1.18) compared to their non-dominant hand (M=3.82, SD=1.33). 
Crucially, this was qualified by a power x motor restriction interaction, F(1,92)=4.78, 
p=.031, ηp2=.05. Powerful participants liked the fork more when they held it in their 
dominant (M=4.72, SD=1.14) rather than their non-dominant hand (M=3.57, SD=1.44), 
F(1,92)=10.12, p=.002, ηp2=.10, CI95% [0.430, 1.860]. Contrary, this difference was not 
significant for powerless participants (Mdominant=4.03, SDdominant=1.14; Mnon-dominant=4.00, 
SDnon-dominant=1.24), F<1, p>.93. Given that merely seeing objects activates the simulations of 
actions in accordance with their affordances (Tucker & Ellis, 1998), this suggests that 
powerful participants integrated the increased fluency of the motor activation in their 
judgment.  
Imagination and imagination fluency. In line with the findings of Shen and 
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Sengupta (2012), there were no differences in reported imagination of reaching toward and 
holding the pen, all Fs<2.4, all ps>.12, all ηp²<.025. However, concerning the fluency of 
imagination a marginal power x motor restriction interaction emerged, F(1,92)=3.13, p=.08, 
ηp²=.03 (see Table1). Decomposing this interaction indicated that whereas powerful 
participants tended to report less fluency of imagination under motor program restriction 
(Munrestricted=4.35, SDunrestricted=0.88; Mrestricted=3.73, SDrestricted=1.04), F(1,92)=3.42, p=.068, 
ηp²=.04, the latter did not affect powerless participants (Munrestricted=4.29, SDunrestricted=1.40; 
Mrestricted=4.51, SDrestricted=1.14), F<1, p>.51. Furthermore, when participants’ motor program 
was restricted powerful participants found it less easy and comfortable to imagine reaching 
out toward the pen and holding it than powerless participants, F(1,92)=6.18, p=.015, ηp²=.06; 
however, when participants’ motor program was not restricted powerful and powerless 
participants reported equal fluency of imagination levels, F<1, p>.87.  
Discussion  
Going beyond the previous experiments, Experiment 3 investigated motor 
interference by restricting people’s spontaneous motor system activation. Consistent with the 
results of Experiments 1-2, power increased liking of a graspable object (a pen) that was in 
view and could (vs. could not) be fluently grasped. The experiment also showed increased 
liking for a utensil (a fork) held in one’s dominant (vs. non-dominant) hand, thus increasing 
the fluency of the utensil’s afforded actions. This finding is consistent with the greater action 
facilitation (Galinsky et al., 2003) found in power holders. Here we show for the first time 
implications for aesthetic judgment.  
One can speculate that even stronger effects should emerge when powerful 
participants are not only visually presented with a target object, but also required to act upon 
it. For example, Ping, Dhillon, and Beilock (2009) showed that people asked to move an 
object to a pre-specified location liked an object (e.g. a cup) more when its handle was 
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pointed towards rather than away from them. The current findings also lend preliminary 
support for the notion that these effects of power on aesthetic judgments are accompanied by 
differences in perceived motor fluency. Specifically, restricting dominant hand movements 
decreased the perceived fluency of reaching towards the graspable object in powerful but not 
powerless participants.  
The previous experiments relied on manipulated differences in motor (dis)fluency 
after the experimental power induction. To rule out that the obtained effects are located in 
acquisition of fluency rather than in the use of motor fluency experiences, Experiment 4 
sought to investigate the extent to which the powerful are guided more strongly in their 
preferences by fluency stemming from habitual motor experiences. Thus, chronic motor 
experiences varied independently of the power manipulation. 
Experiment 4: Habitual Motor Programs 
In the previous experiments, especially the first two, the effects of power could derive 
from differences in the acquisition of motor experiences rather than the reliance on these 
motor experiences. To rule out this possibility, in the present experiment motor training was 
acquired before the power manipulation, forming part of participants’ chronic repertoire. We 
again focused on motor interference and capitalized on Beilock and Holt’s (2007) finding that 
compared to novices, skilled typists like non-interference letter-dyads (typed with fingers 
from different hands) more than interference letter-dyads (typed with the same finger). If 
power holders rely more on chronically accessible motor fluency, then skilled (vs. novice) 
power holders should be more strongly influenced by the motor interference caused by 
interference letter-dyads. In contrast, powerless participants should remain relatively 
unaffected by their motor skills.  
Method 
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Participants and design. We aimed at recruiting 60 participants so that based on a 
median split (see below) we would have a comparable number of experts (i.e., 29) in our 
sample as Beilock and Holt (2007). Because of difficulties in the recruitment of participants, 
data was collected in two waves. Participants were recruited for a study demanding basic 
typing skills (having taken a typing course, using the 10-finger system, or typing at least 3 
hours/week; cf. Beilock & Holt, 2007) and paid £5. They were randomly assigned to 
conditions. Three participants were excluded: One participant who took part twice and had 
also participated in previous experiments involving the same power induction and one 
participant who was an outlier in the reported analysis (Cohen et al., 2003). This left 57 
participants (41 females; Mage=26.82, SDage=9.73) in the sample. Two participants did not fill 
in the manipulation check and control variable scales. 
 Procedure and materials. Participants underwent the power manipulation of 
Experiment 1. Seemingly as part of an unrelated second study, they were then instructed to 
place their fingers on the ASDFJKL-keys (covered by green stickers) and their thumbs on the 
space bar. Participants’ hands were hidden from their view with a black cardboard, and their 
verbally stated preferences were recorded (Beilock & Holt, 2007). Over 10 trials they saw 
two pairs of letters (28-point Courier New font) on the screen, and indicated which of the two 
dyads they spontaneously preferred by saying “1” for the left and “2” for the right dyad.  
 Ten of the meaningless, minimally pronounceable and not rhyming dyads consisted of 
letters that would be typed with the same finger of the same hand (e.g. FV) and 10 of letters 
that would be typed with different fingers from different hands (e.g. FJ). Within each pairing 
of dyads their left/right position was varied (order had no effect); between each presentation a 
750-ms blank screen appeared. Responses were coded 0 for the interference dyads and 1 for 
the non-interference dyads. A preference score >5 indicates a preference for dyads not 
creating motor interference, a score of 5 indicates no preference, and a score below 5 a 
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preference for dyads creating motor interference. Finally, participants completed the same 
power manipulation check as before (r=.67, p<.001). We examined task-evaluation (4 items; 
α=0.78), mood (4 items; α=0.89), and judgment certainty (2 items; r=0.79, p<.001) as before 
(for exploratory scales assessed, see supplemental material online). We did not run any 
additional conditions or measure any additional dependent variables not mentioned here or in 
the footnote7. 
 Participants’ typing speed, based on words-per-minute and errors, was measured via 
an online typing test (www.typingtest.com) after the experiment, in order not to raise 
suspicion amongst participants concerning the experiment’s aim. Participants’ status as 
novices or skilled typists (i.e., their typing expertise) was established based on a median split 
on typing speed. Novices typed more slowly than experts, t(55)=-10.96, p<.001. 
Results  
Manipulation Check. An ANOVA with the between subjects factors power and 
typing expertise revealed that participants in the powerful condition felt more in control 
(M=5.48, SD=1.14) than participants in the powerless condition (M=2.50, SD=1.00), 
F(1,51)=102.24, p<.001, ηp²=.67, CI95% [2.334, 3.491], indicating that the power 
manipulation was successful.  
Aesthetic preferences. Preliminary analyses indicated that, similarly to Experiment 
1, judgment certainty differed by expertise: Compared to experts (M=3.81, SD=1.24), novices 
(M=4.66, SD=1.41) were more certain about their judgments, F(1,51)=5.25, p<.05, ηp²=.09 
                                                
7 Prior to the experiment we assessed the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, 
& Heier, 1996). After the judgment task we assessed the Private Body Consciousness sub-scale (Body 
Consciousness Questionnaire; Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981; α=.81); novices (M=2.46) vs. experts (M=1.89) 
tended to provide higher ratings, F(1,49)=2.63, p=.111. We assessed the Private Self-Consciousness sub-scale 
(Revised Self-Consciousness Scale; Scheier & Caver, 1985; α=.80); high (M=2.23) vs. low power participants 
(M=2.02) tended to provide higher ratings, F(1,49)=2.24, p=.141. With items as in Experiment 1 we assessed if 
participants felt harmony (2 items, r=.70) and based their judgments on thoughts (2 items, r=.58) and feelings (2 
items, r=.36, ps<.01). We only found a power x expertise interaction for thoughts, F(1,49)=4.64, p=.036; high 
(M=5.63) vs. low power experts (M=4.30) tended to provide higher ratings, low (M=5.46) vs. high power 
novices (M=4.94) tended to provide higher ratings, but simple effects were not significant, Fs<1.13, ps>.29.   
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(all other Fs<1, ps>.88). Therefore, judgment certainty and the certainty x power interaction 
(cf. Yzerbyt et al., 2004) were included in the analysis. There were no effects for participants’ 
task-evaluation and mood revealed no significant effects, Fs<1.95, ps>.16, all ηp²<.04. 
A 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (typing expertise: novice vs. experts) 
ANOVA, on participants’ preference scores revealed a power x expertise interaction, 
F(1,49)=6.47, p=.014, ηp²=.12, (see Fig. 4; all other Fs<1.9, ps>.17, all ηp²<.04). Not 
controlling for judgment certainty resulted in a similarly significant interaction, 
F(1,53)=6.25, p=.016, ηp2=.11. As hypothesized, compared to powerful novices (M=5.06, 
SD=0.99) powerful expert typists preferred the dyads not causing interference (M=6.00, 
SD=1.13), F(1,49)=5.87, p=.019, ηp²=.11, CI95% [0.184, 1.975]. For powerless participants no 
preference differences emerged, F<1.35, p>.25, ηp²<.03.  
Discussion  
Compared to powerful novices, powerful expert typists preferred letter-dyads that – if 
typed – create the least motor interference. They used the fluency that arises from covert 
sensorimotor preparation to type them (Holt & Beilock, 2007; Van den Berg et al., 1990) to 
form aesthetic judgments. The powerless demonstrated no such differences based on 
expertise. Thus, habitual motor experiences guided the preferences of powerful individuals 
more strongly. This finding locates the effects of power in the use of motor fluency 
experiences (rather than in their acquisition) because chronic motor experiences varied 
independently of the power manipulation.  
General Discussion 
Four studies provided empirical evidence for a link between social power and motor 
fluency reliance. Power consistently increased reliance on motor fluency, stemming from 
resonance in motor representations (Experiment 1), extraocular muscle training which 
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increased motor activation and preparedness (Experiment 2), or conversely from motor 
fluency being reduced by restricting motor program activation (Experiment 3), and by typing 
motor ease interferences (Experiment 4). Fluency differentially impacted aesthetic judgments 
concerning pictures, movements, objects and letter-dyads. These effects were obtained 
regardless of whether motor fluency was manipulated (Experiments 1-3) or resulted from 
prior expertise (Experiment 4). Furthermore, the experiments ruled out perceived task-
enjoyment, task-demands, mood and confidence as alternative explanations for the effect of 
power. Thus, the current results cannot be explained by these conceivable intervening 
variables. Finally, including a control group (Experiment 2) suggested that high power 
increases, more than low power decreases, reliance on motor fluency.  
One issue that arises is whether the above effects observed in powerful individuals 
stem from differences in the use of the experience of motor fluency in the construction of 
judgments or from increased underlying motor activation in the first place (for a similar 
discussion regarding construct accessibility see Higgins, 1996). Although we did not find 
differences in participants’ self-reported reliance on feelings, felt harmony, and body 
consciousness in Experiments 1 and 4, Experiments 3 and 4 provide some evidence regarding 
mechanisms.  
Specifically, Experiment 4 focused on interference linked to associations previously 
built in connection to typing motor programs, and the motor system was not directly 
activated, as participants were not typing. Here the effects seem to derive from interference 
resulting from previously acquired motor associations. Experiment 3 entailed blocking 
spontaneous motor programs of half of the participants by occupying their dominant hand (cf. 
Shen & Sengupta, 2012; Elder & Krishna, 2012). Blocking led to less perceived fluency of 
action simulation in powerful compared to powerless participants. This experiment provided 
preliminary support for the notion that differences in perceived motor fluency accompany the 
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effects of power on aesthetic judgments.  
The current set of experiments examined a variety of fluency sources involving both 
strong motor activation (see Experiments 1 and 2) and weak or blocked activation 
(Experiments 3 and 4). Thus, though it is conceivable that power may also affect motor 
activations in the first place, this potential additional process does not seem necessary for the 
current effects.  
It is noteworthy that people need not be explicitly aware of their reliance on motor 
fluency (cf. funneled debriefing result of Beilock & Holt, 2007, and Leder et al., 2012; cf. 
pilot study on explicit awareness in Topolinski, 2010; also see Footnote 3). This lack of 
awareness has been shown in other fluency domains; for example, the effects of mood were 
only found for unobtrusive, but not self-report measures (e.g., zygomaticus major activation, 
response times; Topolinski, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009b; 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Therefore, participants may make inferences that utilize 
motor processes even though they are not aware of the ways they construe their judgments, 
thus being unable to report on this when explicitly asked.  
Contributions 
The present findings offer several important contributions. Individuals have a 
supervisory attentional system that regulates the use of automatic and controlled processes 
depending on contextual factors such as the novelty of the situation (see Norman & Shallice, 
1986; Shallice, 2002). The present results suggest that the supervisory attentional system 
monitors the individuals’ social position and uses this information to establish the inputs that 
enter in the construction of judgments: When individuals are socially in control this system 
creates a bias that favors the influence of bodily experiences, in particular motor fluency, at 
the expense of other sources of information.  
Past research showed that power leads to action (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1988; 
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Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote et al., 2002; Keltner et al., 2003). Here we show, for the first 
time, that the actions of power holders have more far reaching consequences than hitherto 
considered. They are an important source of information with consequences beyond the 
outcomes they intend to produce, directly impacting evaluations of stimuli present in the 
environment.  
The present findings contribute to the growing body of evidence showing that the 
judgments of the powerful are more strongly based on bodily (Guinote, 2010a) and cognitive 
subjective experiences (Weick & Guinote, 2008; Guinote, 2007b) than those of powerless 
individuals. They demonstrate a similar attunement to bodily information in the novel domain 
of motor signals. The findings also show the dynamic nature of cognitive systems that take 
into account the states of the perceiver, here linked to power, on a moment-to-moment basis, 
to regulate the relevance of fluency experiences for the to-be-made judgment (cf. Greifeneder 
et al., 2011).   
The findings contribute to the recently established motor fluency domain, 
corroborating the notion that a further, rather neglected instantiation of metacognitive fluency 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009) resides in motor components. The current results demonstrate a 
heightened reliance on interoceptive motor cues amongst the powerful, whether these cues 
stemmed from resonance in motor representation, increased activation and preparedness of 
the motor system, motor interferences hindering the spontaneous activation of the motor 
system in accordance with object affordances, or chronic motor system preparedness.  
Häfner (2013) demonstrated that the embodiment of abstract constructs (e.g., of 
softness in person judgment) is moderated by interoception. Taken together with the current 
findings, this suggests that those with power may display stronger embodied cognition than 
those who do not have power (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012; but see Lee & Schnall, 2014). This 
heightened reliance on interoceptive cues amongst the powerful should furthermore buffer 
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experienced changes in self-other boundaries in response to multisensory stimulation 
(Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014) and ultimately may constitute a factor that contributes 
to the power-social distance link documented in the literature (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, 
& Otten, 2012; Magee & Smith, 2014). Future efforts will have to spell out to what extent 
these propositions are sustained by empirical evidence. 
It is possible that motor fluency impacts attitude judgments more broadly, including 
evaluations of another’s actions. For example, neural circuits related to action execution are 
active when observers see others performing an action, thus resonating with the observed 
motor behavior (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2011; Iacoboni, 2009; Obhi & Hogeveen, 2010). Also, 
action simulations that occur in the mirror neuron system when observing actions of another 
individual (see Gallese, 2005) vary in expertise and thus fluency (Bangert et al., 2006; Calvo-
Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005), which could impact social 
evaluations, in particular in powerful individuals, but only to the extent that others are indeed 
relevant to the powerful (cf. Hogeeven, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2014). Examining the consequences 
of motor fluency for social evaluative judgments remains an important task for future 
research in light of findings demonstrating that motor resonance constitutes a basis for 
understanding the actions of interaction partners (e.g., Decety & Summerville, 2009; Grafton, 
2009).  
Considerations 
We acknowledge that the current set of studies did not address factors that might 
moderate the documented findings. A potentially important factor might be the relevance of 
the fluency experience to the task at hand. Previous research provided evidence for the 
powerful having less strong experiences, as evidenced by reaction time data in tasks where 
the motor interference was unrelated to the judgment task. Specifically, in the Tucker and 
Ellis (1998) paradigm people have to indicate whether presented objects are upright or 
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inverted by pressing a left or a right key, and participants are faster and more accurate when 
the objects’ handles are oriented towards the response hand (i.e., compatible), showing that 
such peripheral cues activate motor programs associated with them. Guinote (2007c) showed 
that powerless, but not powerful, individuals were affected by this peripheral, task-irrelevant 
information and demonstrated delays in action when the peripheral information activated 
inconsistent responses. Consistent with these findings an examination of event related 
potentials in brain activity found that power holders more easily inhibit conflicting 
information and implement desired actions compared to control and powerless individuals 
(Schmid, Kleiman, & Amodio, 2015). Interestingly, in other research using the same 
paradigm by Tucker and Ellis compatible trials resulted in larger zygomaticus activity (i.e., 
an unobtrusive measure of positive affect; see above) – though no effects emerged for 
explicit liking ratings of compatible compared to incompatible objects (Cannon, Hayes, 
Tipper, 2010).  
On the other hand, for experiences related to the judgmental task previous research 
indicates that the powerful are more attentive to cues of internal experiences, even if these 
cues are not valid. In one experiment high power individuals paid greater attention than low 
power or control individuals to bogus variations in their heart rate played back to them when 
judging the attractiveness of presented individuals, judging them more attractive when their 
bogus heartbeat indicated heightened arousal (Jouffre, 2015; Experiment 1). However, when 
this was unrelated to the task (with bogus heartbeat feedback allegedly stemming from 
another person), high power individuals paid less attention to this cue and judged the 
presented target individuals less attractive than control and low power individuals (Jouffre, 
20015; Experiment 2). It is thus conceivable that powerful individuals use fluency 
experiences flexibly depending on their relevance for the task at hand. 
A further question emerging thus seems to be when, rather than whether, the powerful 
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demonstrate greater sensitivity in experiencing motor fluency or greater reliance on motor 
fluency experiences. The relevance of the experience for the task at hand seems to increase 
powerful individuals’ attention to such cues, which they in turn might perceive with more 
sensitivity. Future research investigating this proposition would be advised to rely on 
unobtrusive, ideally neurobiological measures (e.g. fMRI).  
A final consideration pertains to the power manipulation used. Because we 
investigated effects across a range of very different domains and used various paradigms to 
examine motor fluency, we opted to hold the power manipulation constant throughout the 
current experiments. Future work focusing on specific domains or paradigms should also 
consider structural manipulations of power and chronically differing power status.  
Conclusion 
The present work suggests that power leads people to rely more strongly on motor 
fluency in the construction of aesthetic preference judgments, whereas lacking power entails 
more controlled and extensive information processing to increase predictability and control. 
The current findings thus underscore the recently proposed role of motor fluency in judgment 
formation and demonstrate that social factors determine the extent to which experiences of 
motor fluency are integrated in judgment and decision-making process.   
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Figure 1. Participants’ artwork evaluations as a function of movement type executed and art 
style, shown separately for power conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars depict standard 
errors. The evaluation scale ranged from 1 (I do not at all like this painting) to 7 (I like it very 
much).  
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Figure 2. An example of a dot-movement in Experiment 2. The black dot filled a series of 
empty white circles in a 4 × 5 matrix. The dot always started in a randomly chosen corner of 
the matrix and moved in seven steps along the edge of the matrix toward a diagonally 
opposite corner, remaining in each position for 500 ms. The sequence shown, in which the 
dot moved upward and then to the right, induced the same eye movements as moving the 
head downward and then to the left while gazing at a fixation point. (Figure from Topolinski, 
2010). 
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results in increased preference for stimulus movements in the 
direction of training. Experiments 2 and 3 provide further evi-
dence showing that the precise matching in EOM kinematics, 
not perceptual familiarity, is the driving force behind this effect.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Twenty-six (19 female and 7 male) undergradu-
ate students participated for course credit.
Materials and procedure. I used film clips in which a black 
dot filled a series of empty white circles in a 4 × 5 matrix 
(Fig. 1). The dot always started in a randomly chosen corner of 
the matrix and then moved in seven steps along the edge of the 
matrix toward a diagonally opposite corner. The dot remained 
in each position for 500 ms. Thus, the pattern of movement 
always featured a vertical trajectory and a horizontal trajectory 
(e.g., upward and then to the right; illustrated in Fig. 1). The 
dot could start in any of the four corners of the matrix and then 
could move along the edge of the matrix either clockwise or 
counterclockwise. These options resulted in eight different 
film clips that were presented in random ord r. Participants 
were asked to watch the movements of the dot and then 
respond to the question, “How much do you like the move-
ment of the dot?”; responses were given on a scale from 0, not 
at all, to 10, very much.
EOM training task. Immediately before evaluating each clip, 
participants were instructed verbally to close their eyes, hold 
their head straight, and then open their eyes and focus on a 
fixation cross in the middle of the computer screen. Then they 
were asked to move their head consecutively in one vertical 
direction and then one horizontal direction while gazing at the 
fixation point. Some of these head movements matched the 
following dot movements, and thus induced the same EOM 
activity, and some did not. For instance, moving the head 
downward and then to the left while focusing on the fixation 
cross induced the same EOM kinematics as watching the dot 
moving upward and then to the right. In matching trials, head 
movements and subsequent dot movements matched com-
pletely. In mismatching trials, the order of vertical and hori-
zontal head movements and dot movements was similar, but 
either the vertical or the horizontal head movement was made 
in a direction opposite to the direction implied by the dot 
movement (e.g., the head moved downward and then to the 
right before the dot moved upward and then to the right).
Results and discussion
Dot movements were liked more after they followed matching 
ead movemen s (M = 5.18, SD = 1.79) than after they fol-
lowed nonmatching head movements (M = 4.83, SD = 1.92), 
t(25) = 4.29, prep = .99. Thus, training the eye to follow a move-
ment resulted in increased aesthetic preference for that move-
ment. Presumably, this was because the training rendered EOM 
500 ms
500 ms
500 ms
500 ms
500 ms
500 ms
500 ms
500 ms
Fig. 1. An example of dot movement in Experiment 1. The black dot filled a series of empty white circles 
in a 4 × 5 matrix. The dot always started in a randomly chosen corner of the matrix and moved in seven 
steps along the edge of the matrix toward a diagonally opposite corner. The dot remained in each position 
for 500 ms. The sequence shown, in which the dot moved upward and then to the right, induced the 
same eye movements as moving the head downward and then to the left while gazing at a fixation point.
 at Univ Catholique Louvain Bib on April 28, 2012pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Power and Motor Fluency 43 
Figure 3. Participants’ evaluations of dot-movements matching and nonmatching their prior 
EOM-training as a function of experimental condition in Experiment 2. Error bars depict 
standard errors. The evaluation scale ranged from 1 (very unpleasant) to 9 (very pleasant).  
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Figure 4. Participants’ preference of non-interference over interference letter dyads as a 
function of power and typing expertise in Experiment 4. Error bars depict standard errors. 
The scale ranged from 0 to 10, with 5 indicating no preference for either letter dyads type.  
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Table 1 
Means (Standard Deviations) by Motor Restriction and Power for Participants’ Pen Liking 
and Imagination Fluency in Experiment 3. 
 
 Motor Restriction 
(dominant hand occupied) 
No Motor Restriction 
(non-dominant hand occupied) 
 Powerful Powerless Powerful Powerless 
Pen Liking     
 5.31  
(1.18) 
5.67  
(0.95) 
5.85  
(0.74) 
5.15  
(1.27) 
Imagination 
Fluency 
    
 3.72  
(1.04) 
4.51  
(1.14) 
4.35  
(0.88) 
4.29  
(1.40) 
 
